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Abstract
Cyber security is fast becoming a strategic priority across both governments and private organisations. With
technology abundantly available, and the unbridled growth in the size and complexity of information systems,
cyber criminals have a multitude of targets. Therefore, cyber security assessments are becoming common
practice as concerns about information security grow. Penetration testing is one strategy used to mitigate the
risk of cyber-attack. Penetration testers attempt to compromise systems using the same tools and techniques as
malicious attackers thus attempting to identify vulnerabilities before an attack occurs. This research details a
gap analysis of the theoretical vs. the practical classification of six penetration testing frameworks and/or
methodologies. Additionally, an analysis of two of the frameworks was undertaken to evaluate each against six
quality characteristics. The characteristics were derived from a modified version of an ISO quality model.
Keywords
Penetration Testing, Methodology, System Security.

INTRODUCTION
The rate of cyber security threats detected for business and government is increasing, with approximately 7,300
incidents reported to CERT Australia in 2012 and approximately 8,500 incidents reported by August 2013
(CERT, 2013). Consequently, the cyber security industry is growing at a rapid rate with worldwide spending
expected to reach US$86 billion by the year 2016 (Gartner, 2012). Australian security and intelligence agencies
have stated that Australia is experiencing an increase in sophisticated cyber-attacks in both government and
business originating from an array of sources: individuals, organised criminals and foreign intelligence services
(CERT, 2013). The 2013 Cyber Crime and Security Survey showed an overall increase in reported cyber
security incidents from 56 organisations reporting incidents in 2012 to 76 in 2013 (CERT, 2013). Fortunately,
mitigation strategies are available for organisations, governments, and individuals to minimise risk. One
mitigation strategy commonly used within the cyber security industry is penetration testing, commonly referred
to as pentesting (Tang, 2014).
Pentesting aims to evaluate information security measures through the eyes of a potential attacker with the aim
of testing the effectiveness of security controls (Midian, 2003). Pentesting is often employed by organisations as
a mitigation strategy to reduce the risk of an attack on computer resources or in some cases, critical
infrastructure. Pentesting attempts to ensure weaknesses and vulnerabilities in a networked environment are
detected and can be addressed before they are exploited in a real-world attack (Tang, 2014). A security
practitioner tasked with penetration testing will conduct a series of security tests in an attempt to gain access to a
system and exploit security flaws that exist using the same tools and techniques that simulate a malicious attack,
but do so in a controlled manner (Yeo, 2013). A properly scoped and deployed pen test can be an invaluable tool
to assess the ability of a system to survive malicious attack (Valli, Woodward, Hannay, & Johnstone, 2014). The
cornerstone of a successful pen test is its underlying methodology. A well-defined methodology plays a critical
role in achieving results that can be verified and studied to protect data, applications and underlying
infrastructure. Without an established methodology or framework within which to conduct a pen test, identifying
vulnerabilities accurately can become difficult or provide a false sense of security (Frankland, 2009). Wilhelm
(2009, p. 154) asserts that penetration tests are projects that need to be developed using effective and repeatable
processes for improvements to be made, businesses goals to be met, and quality improved, therefore a
methodology is a crucial factor. This suggests that penetration testing is achieving some level of maturity, akin
to software engineering, although the lack of attention paid to software vulnerabilities in initial system releases
may be due to the fixation of project managers on visible functionality as noted by Johnstone (2009).
Avison and Fitzgerald (2006, p. 418) discuss in detail the loose but extensive use of the term “methodology” and
argue that there is very little agreement as to what it means other than at a very general level. Furthermore there
is little in the literature addressing frameworks and methodologies for the purposes of penetration testing
specifically. Consequently pentesting methodologies and frameworks appear to be poorly defined. Despite this
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confusion of terms there are many pentesting methodologies/frameworks available. Certain frameworks or
methodologies are free to use whereas others require some form of membership, payment or contribution, for
example; technical input to the framework or methodology. Several pentesting methodologies and frameworks
widely available in particular include: Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM),
Information Systems Security Assessment Framework (ISSAF), Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP), Metasploit Framework (MSF), and Building Security in Maturity Model (BSIMM) Penetration
Testing Execution Standard (PTES).
The purpose of this research is to evaluate a selection of currently available pentesting methodologies and
frameworks (see above). We perform a gap analysis to determine if a pentesting framework is actually a
framework, i.e., it has a sound underlying ontology. A subset of these frameworks is evaluated against quality
criteria, which will determine their suitability for real world applications.

RELATED WORK
The ISO/IEC 25010:2013 quality standard (Standards Australia, 2013) defines a product quality model
composed of eight characteristics, further divided into sub-characteristics that relate to static properties of
software. We consider the suitability of six different penetration frameworks and methodologies and discuss the
above-mentioned quality standard as a means of selecting evaluation criteria for the frameworks.
Penetration Testing Frameworks and Methodologies
ISSAF is an Open Source, peer-reviewed, penetration testing framework created by the Open Information
Systems Security Group (OISSG). ISSAF is described as a framework and encapsulates multiple methodologies
in draft 0.2.1B. ISSAF attempts to cover all possible domains of a penetration test from conception to
completion. The authors suggest that is easier to remove information rather than develop it from the ground up
(OISSG, 2005). The penetration testing methodology embedded within the framework is divided into three
primary phases, namely; planning and preparation, assessment, and, reporting and clean up. One advantage of
ISSAF in particular is that the distinct relationship between the tasks and their associated tools for each task are
shown.
OSSTMM is an open source security testing methodology introduced in 2000 by the Institute for Security and
Open Methodologies (ISECOM). OSSTMM was developed under peer-review and benefits from open source
licensing, however, access to the latest version (v4), requires paid membership. OSSTMM (v3) is defined as a
methodology that encapsulates modules and channels whereby channels represent different domain areas
(ISECOM, 2000). OSSTMM is primarily an auditing methodology thus is not as comprehensive as ISSAF and
does not provide tools or methods for completing modules however it is a valuable auditing resource that can be
used to satisfy regulatory requirements for corporate assets provided security auditors have sufficient skills to
complete each phase.
OWASP is a not-for-profit organisation focused on improving software security. OWASP provides numerous
tools, guides and testing methodologies for cyber security under open source licenses, in particular, the OWASP
Testing Guide (OTG). OTG is divided into three primary sections, namely; the OWASP testing framework for
web application development, the web application testing methodology, and reporting. The web application
methodology can be used independently, or in conjunction with the testing framework; a developer can use the
framework to build a web application with security in mind followed by a penetration test (web application
methodology) to test the design. Therefore, OTG has a strong focus on web application security throughout the
entire software development lifecycle as opposed to the ISSAF and OSSTMM, both of which are aimed at
security testing an implementation. OTG is targeted specifically to a single domain area, that of web
applications.
Building Security in Maturity Model (BSIMM) is a software security framework licensed under Creative
Commons and authored by McGraw, Migues, and West (2009). In developing BSIMM, its authors observed the
security practices implemented in sixty-seven highly successful companies. BSIMM consists of 112 activities
divided into twelve practices, supporting four domains mainly; governance, intelligence, SSDL touch points, and
deployment. In comparison to ISSAF and OSTMM, BSIMM does not specify what tools to use or how to use
them, but describes practices used by successful companies. Pentesting is one of the practices identified within
BSIMM however pentesting is only one process of many recommended activities.
Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) is a penetration testing standard that was originally created in
2009 by Nickerson et al. (n.d). PTES includes pre-engagement interactions, intelligence gathering, threat
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modelling, vulnerability analysis, exploitation, post exploitation, and reporting. PTES takes advantages of other
resources with the approach of not reinventing the wheel, rather, incorporates other frameworks within it, for
example; OWASP for web application testing is referenced and recommended for use when testing web
applications. PTES attempts to create a baseline for penetration tests whereby a security practitioner and/or
organisation have a reference for what to expect at a minimum concerning penetration testing requirements.
Metasploit is a suite of penetration testing and intrusion detection tools designed to identify and exploit
vulnerabilities on a target system. Metasploit was originally an open source project developed in 2003 but was
acquired in 2009 by Rapid7 which is now responsible for its development and support (Holik, Horalek, Marik,
Neradova, & Zitta, 2014). Metasploit, or the Metasploit Framework (MSF), is available in four different
versions. MSF is suitable for the advanced security professional who has a solid understanding of penetration
testing and is competent using command line pentesting tools. In comparison to ISSAF and OSSTMM, MSF is a
practical solution that provides a suite of tools rather than a documented outline of process and methods to
follow. MSF could be considered an application that encompasses a suite of tools that facilitate a penetration
test.
In summary, there are a diverse range of methodologies and frameworks available. Each has unique
characteristics and takes a distinct approach to penetration testing. The literature suggests a difference in the way
terminology is applied to each concept, thus terms are used interchangeably (or incorrectly). For instance, ISSAF
is defined as a framework however throughout the documentation it refers to methodology as the primary
approach. MSF, on the other hand describes itself as a framework whereas it is a software application
encompassing a suite of tools, therefore clarification on the classification of methodology vs. framework is
essential to avoid confusion.
Quality Models
Figure 1 describes a generic quality model. Standards Australia (2013) clearly state that “It is not practically
possible to specify or measure all sub-characteristics for all parts of a large computer system or software product.
Similarly it is not usually practical to specify or measure quality in use for all possible user-task scenarios. The
relative importance of quality characteristics will depend on the high-level goals and objectives for the project.
Therefore the model should be tailored before use as part of the decomposition of requirements to identify those
characteristics and sub-characteristics that are most important, and resources allocated between the different
types of measure depending on the stakeholder goals and objectives for the product.” Therefore, we have
amended the ISO model to focus less on software quality evaluation and more on aspects of penetration testing
framework evaluation (see figure 2).
The ISO9126 standard contains a taxonomy that defines software by its functionality, reliability, usability,
efficiency, maintainability and portability. Security, which is the primary focus of this research, is defined as a
sub-characteristic of functionality. This is a departure from the commonly held belief that security is solely
within the domain of non-functional requirements. The ISO25010 standard (Standards Australia, 2013) extends
upon this idea and considers security a characteristic in its own right. ISO25010 is, therefore, a replacement for
ISO9126.

Figure 1: Abstract Quality Model (adapted from ISO/IEC 25010:2013).
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EVALUATION OF FRAMEWORKS
First, six methodologies/frameworks were selected for potential use. The selections were classified into either a
methodology or framework category respectively by way of gap analysis to establish whether or not framework
or methodology characteristics were present focusing primarily on the field of penetration testing (see table 2).
Table 1 summarises the gap analysis. Original classification (pre-evaluation) and post evaluation classifications
are shown. The evaluation classifications illustrated in table 1 are an ordinal scale, for example; framework
encapsulates methodology and methodology encapsulates tools, techniques, and resources. In addition
frameworks that have included methodology in a particular framework are identified. We arrived at an
individual evaluation based on theoretical analysis of each framework/methodology. Each framework or
methodology underwent analysis to determine whether or not framework or methodology characteristics were
present (or absent).
Table 1: Evaluation Matrix

Legend
Pre-evaluation Classification

*

Post-evaluation Classification

+

From the gap analysis it was possible to develop a taxonomy of penetration testing specific frameworks or
methodologies whereby suitable candidate methodologies or frameworks can be identified to facilitate their use
in practice or research. We found that some frameworks were indeed frameworks in the accepted sense of the
word, whereas others were simple collections of tools without a discernible underlying ontology. We felt that
this was an important distinction because novice pen testers would benefit from the additional support provided
by a mature framework.
Table 2: Classification of Penetration Testing Frameworks and Methodologies.

Suitability
Classification
Candidate

Framework

ISSAF




BSIMM
PTES
MSF

Other

Penetration Testing
Specific

Security
Assessment






OSSTMM
OTG

Methodology
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Selecting candidates for the evaluation of quality was determined by two criteria. First, whether or not a
particular candidate classified as either framework or methodology. Candidates that fall under a methodology or
framework were deemed in-scope, thus eliminating all other candidates. The second criterion was to examine the
boundaries of a particular candidate for its scope, in other words, whether or not a particular candidate is focused
entirely on penetration testing as opposed to an overall security assessment. The research being undertaken has a
primary goal of evaluating penetration testing methodologies and frameworks explicitly rather than assessing the
security posture of an organisation in its entirety, therefore candidates that are categorised as penetration testing
explicitly are preferred over security assessment specific candidates. As a result the two remaining candidates
are ISSAF and OTG.
Next, quality characteristics were nominated (see figure 2), for the purpose of evaluating the refined subset of
frameworks. Two factors were taken into consideration for selection of quality characteristics. First, the field of
study or context from which a characteristic definition was drawn (in particular that of information systems was
preferred); and second, whether or not a particular quality characteristic was directly applicable to the field of
penetration testing.

Figure 2: Penetration Testing Quality Model (adapted from ISO/IEC 25010:2013).
From the revised taxonomy shown in table 3, the selected quality metrics are applicable to both frameworks.
Both frameworks display evidence of the quality characteristics applicable to penetration testing, therefore the
six quality characteristics selected are considered suitable, thus will be used to facilitate this research in
evaluating efficiency for the two chosen candidates, ISSAF and OTG. Note that reliability, whilst a valid
characteristic, was not tested in this evaluation due to lack of delivery of an expected real-world case study.
Table 3: Quality Matrix of Selected Penetration Testing Frameworks.
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DISCUSSION
Gap analysis
The gap analysis showed in some cases that the classification of a particular framework and/or methodology can
often be misleading, for instance; MSF is described as a framework; however, a subsequent evaluation of
characteristics using factors outlined in table 1, showed that MSF more closely aligns with a suite of penetration
testing tools, therefore is appropriately classified as an application suite that can facilitate a penetration test
rather than a framework. In contrast, OTG was pre-classified as a standard or guide, however strong framework
characteristics are identified throughout the documentation that suggest framework characteristics in contrast to
its original classification, thus, the post-evaluation classification more appropriately aligns with framework.
Turning to PTES, the characteristics do not illustrate enough properties to be considered either a methodology or
framework, due to incomplete documentation or loose structure when compared to the more mature frameworks
evaluated. It should be noted however that PTES has the potential to be further developed into a framework
should future amendments be undertaken; as a consequence PTES classifies as a resource post-evaluation. From
the six frameworks and/or methodologies reviewed, three (ISSAF, OSSTMM, and BSIMM), agree with the preevaluation classification, in other words did not change classification post-evaluation. As can be expected, the
three aforementioned frameworks are considered mature, therefore it is not surprising that the classification of
these three in particular, do not change post evaluation. Although not all the frameworks and methodologies
evaluated show disparity with relation to classification it is important to note that some do, of which
consideration needs to be given. The consequence of inappropriate classification lends itself to the possibility
that penetration testing practitioners risk implementing or become reliant on a framework or methodology that
might not meet an organisations goals in relation to completing a penetration test in its entirety, moreover
adapting an approach that could potentially fail.
Measurement of Frameworks with Quality Characteristics
Both OTG and ISSAF were measured by the quality characteristics denoted in table 3. In some cases this
measurement was not direct, as the characteristic did not have a direct mapping to a concept/artefact used in
pentesting. An example would be “maintainability”.
Conventional measures of software maintainability are not suitable for pentesting frameworks as the artefacts in
question are documents or risk matrices rather than software artefacts (such as code). However, some
commonalities exist as penetration testing in its essence is testing software and/or hardware with software of
some type in most cases.
Maintainability is the ease in which a framework can be understood, adapted, enhanced or modified. To measure
this characteristic, consideration is given particularly to the number of revisions (frequency of change) a
framework has undergone since inception. The frequency of change (actually a sub-characteristic of
maintainability) can be quantified by the number of revisions a framework has undergone in its lifetime, the
underlying assumption being that revisions reflect a measure of activity. The type of activity, whether bug fixes,
documentation readability, addition of new features or other activity is not considered in isolation in this
instance. Both OTG and ISSAF do not offer enough comparative information; therefore that level of detail is
restricted. It is also worth mentioning that other sub-characteristics, namely; applicability, analysability,
testability, and relevancy, can be incorporated as additional measures. Discussion of these other subcharacteristics is outside the scope of this particular research, therefore we focus here on one sub-characteristic
that can be quantified.
Table 4: Total number of revisions (r) / framework lifetime in years (t)
Revisions
Years
Date
of
Inception
ISSAF
5
2
December,
2004
OTG 3.0 + 4.0 468
7
May, 2008
(245 + 223)

Table 4 shows that OTG averaged 66 revisions per year in comparison to ISSAF which averaged 2.5 revisions
per year. While it is obvious OTG had far more revisions than its counterpart it does not necessarily prove that
ISSAF lacks quality. Moreover, other factors come to the fore, for example; Does OTG have more contributors
than ISSAF?, Were revisions for OTG related to bad design, or does it simply suggest the product is better
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overall? These questions are considerations for future research, however we conclude that OTG is more
maintainable than ISSAF, due to its higher revision activity.
Similarly, Usability is measured by its sub-characteristic, Readability. Readability is significant as a subcharacteristic of usability primarily because the penetration testing frameworks evaluated in this research are
documents, therefore if a document is not readable, usability is affected. Readability is concerned with the level
of difficulty to read or comprehend written text (Ludger & Gottron, 2012). There are a number of ways to
measure vocabulary difficulty and sentence length to predict the difficulty level of text resulting in various
readability formulae in use today (DuBay, 2004). One such formula known as the Gunning Fog Index (GFI),
was published by Gunning (1952, p. 36), developed specifically for adults. Fog index attempts to estimate the
number of years of education that is required by the reader in order to understand the text at first reading, for
example a GFI score of 10 would indicate that ten years of formal schooling is required to understand the text.
The formula works with two variables; first, the average sentence length (ASL), and second, the number of
words with more than two syllables for each one hundred words (PHW). Finally the result is multiplied by 0.4
(DuBay, 2004), thus produces the formula: Grade Level (GL) = 0.4 (ASL + PHW).

Framework
GFI Score

Table 5: Fog Index Scores
ISSAF
OTG
7.7
11

Results were obtained using an automated tool that calculates various readability scores, among them GFI score.
The readability score automation tool is available for public use released as an open source project ("ReadilityScore," 2015).
From table 5 it is clear that ISSAF is more readable than OTG. Taking into consideration the intended users of
both frameworks it can be safely assumed that a security practitioner would have a minimum of 11 years formal
schooling therefore readability scores for both frameworks are sufficient.

CONCLUSION
This paper examined several penetration testing frameworks and methodologies, with particular reference to
ISSAF and OWASP’s OTG. It was found that many frameworks were either mis-named (i.e., were not actually
frameworks) or lacked domain coverage or a sound ontological foundation and thus were restricted in their
application.
The frameworks were selected for evaluation based on their focus (penetration testing specific or security
general) and their ability to act as a framework (rather than a collection of techniques without a unifying theme).
We found that many “frameworks” were not able to be generalised across problem domains (as would be
expected for a generic pentesting framework). The quality characteristics mapped well to the selected
frameworks (ISSAF and OTG), which suggests that they are appropriate candidates to evaluate penetration
testing frameworks.
The next step in this research programme is to evaluate the selected frameworks with a real-world case study.
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